Daoshengʼs clan name was Wei 魏, and he was originally from Pengcheng 彭城 i.e. mod. Xuzhou 徐州. He took his vows with Fatai 法泰 (who was in turn a student of Fotudeng 佛圖澄), at Waguansi 瓦官寺 in Jiankang 建康 (mod. Nanjing). By about fifteen he was renowned for his ability to lecture on texts. He took his full vows at twenty.

In his thirties he began to travel, and probably arrived at Lushan 廬山, at the time a major center of Buddhist activity under Huiyuan 慧遠, in about 397. He spent seven years there, during which time he learned not only from Huiyuan but also from the Sarvâstivādin Saṃghadeva 僧伽提婆, who had arrived at Lushan in 385 and there translated a number of texts. Liebenthal believes he probably wrote his Er di lun (二帝論 “Treatise on the Two Truths”) during this period.

In 405 Daosheng went north to Chang'an with Huiyan 慧嚴, Huirui 慧叡 and Huiguan 慧觀. There he participated in Kumārajīvaʼs 鳩摩羅什 epoch-making translation workshop; chronology of the translations produced there suggests Daosheng was present during the translation of the Lotus Sutra 法華經 T 262 and the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra 維摩經 T 475 (both translated in 405); of the Chan miyao fa jing 禪祕要法經 T 613 (in 407) and the 小品般若波羅蜜經 T 227. Daosheng is said to have later written commentaries on all these texts except for T 163. During his time in Chang'an he is supposed also to have bested Daorong 道融 (a disciple of Kumārajīva and a favorite of the ruler Yao Xing) in formal debate.

In 408 Daosheng returned to Lushan, bringing with him Sengzhaoʼs Bore wu zhi lun 般若無知論, to which Liu Yimin 劉遺民 (d. 410) wrote a reply. In 409 Daosheng went on to Jiankang. In 423 he participated in the translation of the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya 彌沙塞五分戒本 T 1422, which was translated by Buddhajīva from a text that had been brought back to China by Faxian. In 428 controversy erupted over his radical (for a time) doctrine that even icchantika could be saved (see below), and he was expelled from the monastic community. He went first to Huqiu 虎丘 in Suzhou 蘇州, where he may have visited Fagang 法鋼. In 430, he returned once more to Lushan. In 432 Daosheng was recalled in triumph to the Southern capital when it was discovered from the later, Dharmakṣema version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra that his interpretation of icchantika doctrine was orthodox. He composed a commentary on the Lotus Sutra before dying, according to Liebenthal, on Nov. 27 the same year. (However, Liebenthal seems to have miscalculated in converting this date; Sengyou, in CSZJJ, places Daoshengʼs death in 元嘉 11, i.e. 434; T 2145.45.111a18-22; cf. GSZ T 2059 (L) 367a5-10.) He was survived by only two disciples known to us by name: Daoyou 道猷 and Fayuan 法瑗 (see Liebenthal, 'Biography' 310–311, n. 110, 111).

Only some of Daoshengʼs works are still extant – primarily his commentaries: (1) on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, extant in the 注維摩詰經 T 1775, and also in the 淨名經集解關中疏 T 2777; (2) on the Lotus Sutra, 法華經疏 = 妙法蓮花經疏 X577; (3) on the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, extant in the 大般涅槃經集解 T 1763 (it is the oldest of the commentaries collected here by Senglang). Also extant is (4) a letter to Wang Wei 王衞, quoted at the end of the Bian zong lun 辯宗論.Fragments of other writings, including correspondence etc., are also extant where quoted in other works etc. For a full list of Daoshengʼs writings, see Liebenthal, “Biography,” 312–316. In the second part of his 'World Conception of Chu Tao-sheng' (1956–1957), Liebenthal has organized numerous passages from Daoshengʼs extant writings by theme, and translated them. (Liebenthalʼs translations are sometimes idiosyncratic and not entirely reliable.) Daoshengʼs preface to the MPNS, which is preserved in the Da niepanjing ji jie T 1763.37.377b10–22, has been translated by Whalen Lai.

Daosheng is most noted for his advocacy of the belief that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature 佛性, against claims found in the first (Faxian) translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra in 418 that icchantikas cannot be saved. While such assertions initially brought him criticism (and expulsion from the order), he held to his position, even vowing that his body should be covered with leprosy if he was wrong. The leader of criticism against Daosheng was one Zhisheng 智勝, who had also taken part in Buddhajīvaʼs translation of T 1422 (see above). With the translation of the Dharmakṣema version of the Nirvana Sutra 涅槃經 into Chinese, Daosheng found direct textual support for his beliefs about the icchantika in passages in Ch. 23 stating that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and are capable of attaining liberation; the text explicitly includes icchantika in these statements. Liebenthal speculates that Daosheng may have had advance knowledge of the contents of the longer version of the MPNS, upon which he was able to found his apparent prescience ( “Biography of Tao-sheng,” 305–306). His grounds are as follows. (1) Faxian arrived in Shandong in 412 and met Xie Lingyun in Jiankang in 413; (2) Xie is the author of a dedication, written in 413, to a shrine erected in 412 in memoriam of Faxianʼs visit to the Cave of the Buddhaʼs Shadow in Nagarahāra, during his travels. In this dedication, Xie already makes oblique reference to the notion that the icchantika too will be saved (禪堤獲自拔之路 etc.). (3) Xie was, as is well known, a close companion of Daosheng before he staked his claim about icchantika.

Daosheng is also supposed to have propounded a doctrine of sudden enlightenment; this position is primarily known, it seems, from second-hand accounts, such as a sutra preface by Liu Qiu 劉虬 preserved in the Chu sanzang ji ji 岀三藏記集, and Huidaʼs 慧達 commentary to the Zhao lun 肇論疏 X 866 (see Liebenthal, “World Conception” 255–258). In describing the debates over subitism vs. gradualism in which Daosheng was embroiled, Huida calls the position of Daosheng and his ilk the 'new teaching'  新教, as opposed to an 'old teaching'  舊教. Daosheng was also embroiled in debates in his time over the immortality of the soul, in which context he taught a 'true self' or 'spiritual self' (zhenwo 眞我, shenwo 神我). He held that there was really no such thing as a Pure Land, but that the idea was a mere expedient (see passages collected in Liebenthal, “World Conception” 254–255). He also clearly distinguishes between karmic rewards for meritorious deeds, and a separate dharmic order of practice necessary for full liberation 'becoming a Buddha' (T 1775.38.414b28–c3). (Liebenthal interprets this last doctrine, seemingly following Tang Yongtong, to mean that Daosheng denies karma altogether, an interpretation which seems unfounded, at least in the text Liebenthal cites.)

More frequently than Buddhist scripture, Daosheng quotes or alludes to Chinese classics, especially the Yijing (e.g. the formula 卽性窮理, for which see Shuo gua 說卦 9.1, Liebenthal, “World Conception” 66; used verbatim by Daosheng e.g. at T 1775.38.375a5; also in paraphrases, e.g. 佛以窮理爲主, T 1775.38.353c15; 盡理, T 1775.38.377b04, etc.), the Daode jing (e.g. Chapter 48, 損之又損之以至於無損矣, X577.27.13b07, Liebenthal, “World Conception” 80, 261), and the Zhuangzi. In keeping with broader trends among Buddhist intellectuals of his time, among whom hangovers from the geyi 格義 mode of translation and interpretation were still prevalent, these broadly 'Daoist' intellectual debts are reflected in Daoshengʼs specific articulations of key Buddhist ideas. In particular, he identifies Buddhahood, the dharmakāya, Buddha nature etc. with the neo-Daoist (i.e. Xuanxue 玄學) concepts of cosmic 'principle/pattern' (li 理, 自然), 'substance' (ti 體); to the source/ground (本) etc.; and he identifies liberation, Nirvāṇa etc. with a 'return' (歸, 反) to this primary or original state, with conformity to it, etc: e.g. 成佛從理, T 1763.37.547c17–18; 任理得悟, T 1775.38.373a21; 乖理爲惑... 反則悟理, X577.27.10b11; 乖理成縛。得理則涅槃 T 1763.37.533a01–02; 眞理自然... 從迷乖之... 反迷歸極。歸極得本 T 1763.37.377b10–13, Liebenthal, “World Conception” 245; 違其大本封著者則乖於法理 T 1775.38.345c14–15; 佛性體也 T 1763.37.544a22 (in this last context, Daosheng goes on immediately to identify Buddha-nature with the Buddha alone, 唯佛是佛性也 T 1763.37.544a23–24).

Li 理 in particular is, in fact, central to Daoshengʼs thought, as Liebenthal points out is also the case for the writings of Huiyuan; in both, it is likely to stem from the Guo Xiang 郭象 (252–312) commentary to the Zhuangzi ( “World Conception” 65–66). In addition to points noted above, li is further identified with the dharmakāya (理爲法身 X 577.27.9a01). Li is also identified (in a sophisticated exposition that may give the lie to the claim that Daosheng somehow had a shallow or misguided notion of Mahāyāna doctrine) with the abstract principle that phenomena subject to arising and cessation have no essence ( 'substance,'  體); this principle itself does not arise or cease, i.e. is identified with a paradoxical 'essence' that is anutpatti, anirodha; T 1775.38.354a11–17, (mistranslated in) Liebenthal, “World Conception” 246.

In a similar neo-Daoist vein, Buddhahood elsewhere described as the 'one ultimate' (佛爲一極, X577.27.4c24); or as the 'eternal nonexistent' (佛常無也, T 1775.38.410b21). Daosheng often interprets Buddhist doctrine in terms of other similar rubrics, such as 'primary and derivative [existents]' (lit. 'root and branches,'  本末), 'substance and function' (體用), etc. In his interpretation of the Buddhaʼs docetic emanation of manifold nairmāṇikakāya out of a single dharmakāya to suit the varied capacities of sentient beings, Daosheng utilizes the Chinese notion of 'stimulus and response' causation (感應): thus, the Buddha only enters into phenomenal existence as a 'response' (於應爲有 T 1775.38.410b21); see further T 1775.38.343a22–23; passages listed in Liebenthal, “World Conception” 248–250; Daosheng also refers to the nairmāṇikakāya as yingshen 應身 (e.g. X577.27.10c11). In the context of such discussions of Buddhas appearing in the phenomenal world as upâyic responses to the needs and capacities of sentient beings, Daosheng regularly invokes the notion of ji (機, 'trigger-point,'   'catalyst,'   'conjunction of circumstances' ) to refer to the particular state of the sentient being (e.g. 無機感聖 T 1776.38.427b05; 昔化之機扣聖。聖則府應 X577.27.7c09). Similarly, Daoist echoes can be heard in his explanation that ignorance arises, and sentient beings are thus aliened from 'origin'  本, 'principle'  理 etc., because of the intervention of 'passion,'   'sentiment' (qing 情) (著生死樂情異於本 etc. X577.37.8b23; passage cited in extenso, but with unhelpful translation, in Liebenthal, “World Conception” 263–265). Daosheng also anticipates later Huayan 華嚴宗 terminology in using the notion of li 理 in conjunction with that of 'things' (shi 事, e.g. 1775.38.396c13; 理圓事畢 X577.27.16a20). Daosheng also glosses the notion of skillful means (kuśalôpāya) with reference to the Zhuangzi trope of baskets and traps for catching fish and hares (X577.27.15b02–03).

In these various respects, Daoshengʼs ideas have frequently been treated by scholars as part of a larger process of sinification of Buddhist concepts. Traditional doxographical statements have also often linked Daoshengʼs subitism and his belief in the universality of Buddha-nature, but Liebenthal has suggested the two positions were originally developed in isolation from one another. Earlier modern scholars (e.g. Hu Shi) also sometimes (rather implausibly) took Daosheng for a founder or precursor of Chinese Chan 禪 Buddhism, primarily because of his advocacy of a subitist 頓教 position. Lai notes that Daoshengʼs subitist position (like that of his champion Xie Lingyun 謝靈運, we might add), met with broad criticism from his contemporaries (most representatively, Huiguan 慧觀). This might give us pause in following common claims (perhaps first formulated by Xie himself) that subitism was somehow more amenable to Chinese assumptions (or a putative Chinese character), where Indian Buddhism tended more to gradualism, thus making emphasis on subitism a sinified feature of Buddhist doctrine; at least in Daoshengʼs time, it appears that this may not really have been the case.

Daosheng is commonly listed in Buddhist catalogues as 竺道生; some dictionaries, such as Mochizuki and the Fo Guang Dictionary provide their entries under this head word. 〔出三藏記集, 梁高僧傳, 佛祖統紀〕

References:

Ch'en, Kenneth. 1964. Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey. Princeton:  Princeton University Press. p. 112-120.

Lai, Whalen. 1982. “The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and its Earliest Interpreters in China: Two Prefaces by Tao-lang and Tao-sheng.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 102 no. 1 : 102–103.

Liebenthal, Walter. 1955. “A Biography of Chu Tao-sheng.” Monumenta Nipponica 11, no. 3 : 284–316.

----. 1955. “Chinese Buddhism During the 4th and 5th Centuries.” Monumenta Nipponica 11, no. 1 : 44–83.

----. 1956. “The World Conception of Chu Tao-sheng.” Monumenta Nipponica 12, no. 1/2 : 65–103.

----. 1956-1957. “The World Conception of Chu Tao-sheng.” Monumenta Nipponica 12, no. 3/4 : 241–268.

Yu, David C. 1974. “Skill-in-Means and the Buddhism of Tao-sheng: A Study of a Chinese Reaction to the Mahāyāna of the Fifth Century.” Philosophy East and West 24, no. 4 : 413–427.